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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE E. HARVEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OWEN L. SANDERS, et al., 
Defendants, 
KENNETH E. COOMBS, LYNN H. 
COOMBS, GROW WEST NO. 2, and 
HUNTINGTON PARK, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
ALBERT W. H O R M A N , d/b/a A. 
HORMAN & CO., 
Third Party Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Because Respondent has chosen to ignore the num-
erous authorities cited by Appelknte and to gloss over 
the main contentions of Appellants, but instead has raised 
additional issues not dealt with in Appellants' Brief, 
Appellants deem it necessary to file this reply to the 
new issues raised. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants reaffirm their statement of facte in their 
initial brief and make the following clarifications of as-
sertions made in Respondent's statement of facts: 
On page 2 of Respondent's Brief it is asserted that 
Appellants failed to make payments due Intermountain, 
were therefore in default under Contract "B" and that 
this default caused the payments under Contract "A" to 
become delinquent. This assertion is only an allegation 
of Respondent's Cross-Claim (R. 31-32) which was de-
nied by Appellants (R. 34-36) and is yet to be determined 
by the court. Furthermore, Intermountain's obligation 
to the Plaintiff under Contract "A" was an independent 
obligation and its default under that contract was its 
own fault and was in no way caused by Appellants. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COOMBS' ALLEGATION OF ANTICI-
PATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT "B" WAS 
D E N I E D BY INTERMOUNTAIN AND 
PROVED UNTRUE WHEN INTERMOUN-
TAIN PURCHASED AT THE SHERIFF'S 
SALE. THE ALLEGATION WAS MADE TO 
AVOID A MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS AND 
CONSTITUTED NO ELECTION TO GIVE 
UP ANY CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY. 
The Respondent's sole contention in his brief is that 
the Coombs, by claiming anticipatory breach of conitract 
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by Intermountain, "elected" to treat the contract as 
broken and are estopped from changing their minds to 
claim an interest in the property. This contention is 
based entirely on the allegation of anticapatory breach 
in the Coombs' Cross-Claim. The alleged anticipatory 
breach was based upon Intarmountain's failure to make 
payments as required under Contract "A" which resulted 
in the foreclosure action by Plaintiff. Had Intermountain 
lost its interest in the property in this foreclosure, it 
would have been unable to provide title to the property 
to the Coombs as required under Contract "B". This 
would have been a breach of Contract "B" for which the 
Coombs would have been entitled to recover damages. 
However, Inteimountain denied that it had committed 
anticipatory breach and, by purchasing the property at 
Sheriff's sale, obtained title to the property and made 
it possible to provide good title to the Coombs under 
Contract "B". Therefore, the claim of anticipatory breach 
proved untrue. There being no anticipatory breach, the 
Coombs had no election of remedies to make. Contract 
"B" is still in effect and the Coombs are not estopped 
from claiming the property sold to them under the con-
tract. 
Horman's reliance upon Hurwitz v. David K. Rich-
ard's Company, 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P. 2d 794 (1968), is 
misplaced. That case does not hold "that where antici-
patory breach of contract is alleged, the party so alleging 
has the following options . . . " a s claimed by Horman. 
Instead, by way of dictum, it states that "if there had 
been an anticipatory breach, Richards had three options 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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. . ." The court held there was no anticipatory brteach 
because there had been no "positive and unequivocal 
manifestation" that the contract would not be performed. 
Furthermore, it stated that a repudiation may be with-
drawn before the time for performance arrives unless the 
other party manifests an election to rescind the contract 
or materially changes his position in reliance on the re-
pudiation. Likewise, there was no anticipatory breach 
in the case before the court and therefore the options 
stated in that case were not available to the Coombs here. 
Since the claim of anticipatory breach was premature 
and proved untrue, the only claim yet to be resolved was 
the allegation by Intermountain, in its Cross-Claim, that 
the Coombs were in default under Contract "B" and 
that Intermountain should be "released from all obliga-
tions in law and equity to convey said property." This 
allegation of default was denied by the Coombs and is 
yet to be resolved by the court. There has been no trial 
or other hearing concerning this issue. I t was Intermoun-
tain that requested the count to terminate the interest 
of the Coombs. Yet Intermountain has taken no action 
to have the court rule on this issue. Until this question 
of default by the Coombs has been tried, and until the 
interest of the Coombs in the property under Contract 
"B" has been properly terminated, the Coombs still have 
an interest in the property of which all purchasers (in-
cluding Horman) must take notice. The purpose of the 
Third-Party Complaint against Horman is to declare his 
deed null and void or at least to subject his deed to any 
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interest in the property that might eventually be de-
creed in the Coombs in this lawsuit. 
Why then did the Coombs allege anticipatory breach 
and why are the allegations of hreach retained in its 
subsequent pleadings? The answers should be obvious. 
The claim was originally made in order to settle all claims 
in one suit in the event Intermountain did not purchase 
the property at Sheriff's sale nor redeem it after the 
sale. The claim of breach would then have been valid. 
The reason for retaining* the damage claims against In-
termountain is to protect the Coombs' claim in the event 
Horman should prevail on this appeal and the property 
is therefore beyond the reach of the Coombs. But if the 
interest of the Coombs in the property is still effective 
and the property can be conveyed by Intermountain, 
then the damage claims are no longer valid. The Coombs 
are not attempting to affirm the contract in part and 
to rescind it in part, as claimed by Horman, but merely 
to pursue alternative claims which depend upon the 
outcome of this appeal. 
I t should be remembered that it was Intermountain 
that asserted a default in this case. The long delay in 
this case is the fault of Intermountain for not having 
pursued its claim of default. And without ever proving 
its case, and while its own Cross-Claim was stiH pending, 
Intermountain attempted to dispose of the property sub-
ject to that Cross-Claim. The Coombs are only asking 
for a resolution of the claims asserted by Intermountain. 
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If in fact the interest of the Coombs has been forfeited 
or otherwise terminated, then they have no claim against 
Horman. But if the interest of the Coombs is still valid 
and effective, then Horman took his deed subject to that 
interest. 
Because Horman relies entirely on his claim that the 
Coombs elected to sue for damages, he has failed to re-
spond to the main contentions in Appellants' Brief. I t is 
therefore assumed that he agrees with the arguments 
that purchase at the Sheriff's sale by Intermoxmtain re-
instated Contract "B" and that the recorded Contract 
"B" and lis pendens effectively gave Horman notice of 
the interest of the Coombs. He also does not dispute 
that he had actual notice of the interest of the Coombs. 
Rather, he chose to ignore these facts, of which he had 
actual and constructive notice, and took a deed from 
Intermountain under the mistaken assumption that the 
Coombs had elected to rescind the contract — which 
they have never done. For this mistake he has recourse 
against his seller, Iiitermountain. 
CONCLUSION 
The Coombs' allegation of anticipatory breach did 
not establish such a breach. In fact the lack of such a 
breach has been established. They, therefore, had no 
remedy to elect. They have waited for Intermountain 
to prove its claim of default and until that, and proper 
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termination of the contract are proved, they retain their 
interest in the property. Since Horman had both actual 
and constructive notice of the interest of the Coombs, his 
deed should be made subject to that interest, whatever 
the court may determine that interest to be. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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